The End of World-Time: Indimergence, Curved Possibility, Recurrence, and the Limit of World-Capability

Abstract

The present paper clarifies a structural tension within indimergence-based ontologies: on the one hand, the consistent assumption of curvature, negative topology, and irreversible loss of possibility implies that every stabilized world necessarily ends in a funnel-like constriction. On the other hand, earlier works have shown that indimergence is not only closing but simultaneously differentiating, implying new orders of complexity that cannot be understood as a mere continuation of the same world. Without explicit clarification, this gives rise to the impression of an ontological contradiction between the end of the world and emergence.

The paper argues that this contradiction is only apparent and results from an insufficient determination of temporality. Time is not defined as a neutral medium, but as the trace of irreversible loss of possibility. The funnel therefore does not designate the end of reality, but the end of that form of time under which a particular world can exist in a stable manner at all. In this understanding, the singularity does not mark a future point within the same temporal order, but the limit of the applicability of world-time itself.

Indimergence thus performs a double, logically non-temporal operation: it terminates the world-capability of a given topology while simultaneously implying another order of differentiation that is neither world-internal, nor sequential, nor processual. The ontological space of possibility within which phenomena such as recurrence occur is likewise subject to the curvature produced by indimergence and is therefore not available as a neutral space of emergence. Within this framework, complexity does not grow through continuation within the world, but through an ontological displacement of the conditions of world-formation. The paper thereby disciplines both funnel-shaped end-time readings and emergence-idealistic misunderstandings, and precisely determines the boundary between the end of the world, the end of time, and differentiation.